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Recent years witnessed a growing interest in non-standard epistemic logics of knowing whether,
knowing how, knowing what, knowing why and so on. The new epistemic modalities introduced in
those logics all share, in their semantics, the general schema of ∃xϕ , e.g., knowing how to achieve ϕ
roughly means that there exists a way such that you know that it is a way to ensure that ϕ . Moreover,
the resulting logics are decidable. Inspired by those particular logics, in this work, we propose a
very general and powerful framework based on quantifier-free predicate language extended by a new
modality x, which packs exactly ∃x together. We show that the resulting language, though much
more expressive, shares many good properties of the basic propositional modal logic over arbitrary
models, such as finite-tree-model property and van Benthem-like characterization w.r.t. first-order
modal logic. We axiomatize the logic over S5 frames with intuitive axioms to capture the interaction
between x and know-that operator in an epistemic setting.
1 Introduction
Standard epistemic logic studies valid reasoning patterns about knowing that. However, in natural lan-
guage, knowledge is also expressed by knowing whether, knowing how, knowing what, knowing why and
so on. Recent years witnessed a growing interest in the non-standard epistemic logics of such expres-
sions (cf. e.g., [32, 41, 42, 16, 7, 8, 38, 40, 29, 39, 11, 30, 28, 2] and the survey [39]).1 In this line of
work, various new modalities of know-wh are introduced,2 all of which share the general de re schema
∃xϕ(x) in their semantics, e.g, “knowing how to achieve ϕ” roughly means that there exists a way
such that you know that it is a way to ensure that ϕ [40]; “knowing why ϕ” means that there exists an
explanation such that you know that it is an explanation to the fact ϕ [44]. Actually, in the early days
of epistemic logic, Hintikka already used such formulations to handle knowing who [20] (cf. the survey
[39] for a detailed discussion on Hintikka’s early contributions). Such interpretations are grounded also
in philosophy and linguistics (cf. e.g., [36, 35]).
Such a semantic schema is based on the so-called mention-some interpretation to the wh-questions
embedded in those knowledge expressions [17]. There is also a mention-all interpretation [15], which
makes sense in many other situations, e.g., “knowing who came to the party” means, under an exhaustive
reading, that for each relevant person, you know whether (s)he came to the party or not, which can
be summarized as ∀x(ϕ(x)∨¬ϕ(x)). There are degenerated cases when the two interpretations
coincide, e.g., “knowing [what] the value of c [is]” means, under the interpretation of mention-some,
that there exists a value such that you know that it is the value of c, which is equivalent to the mention-all
interpretation: for any value, you know whether it is the value of c, given there is one and only one real
value of c.
∗The author thanks Pavel Naumov for insightful initial discussions on the language and semantics of this framework, and
thanks Timothy Williamson for pointing out the categorization of know-wh by mention-all and mention-some. The author is
also grateful to Yanjun Li and Jixin Liu for carefully reading an earlier draft of the paper.
1This is not meant to be an exhaustive list, e.g., see also [26, 19, 25] about logics of knowing how in the setting of ATL.
2Know-wh means verb know followed by a wh-word.
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Given the experiences in dealing with those particular cases of know-wh, it is the time to lay out a
general background framework for the shared “logical core” of those logics.3 This paper is the initial
step towards this purpose by extending the predicate language with the mention-some operatorx, which
is essentially a package of ∃x. With the variable in place, we can say much more than those existing
logics of know-wh, e.g., “I know a theorem of which I do not know any proof” x¬yProve(y,x), or, in
a multi-agent setting, “i knows a country which j knows its capital”: xi
y
jCapital(y,x). Actually, when
x does not appear in ϕ ,xϕ is equivalent toϕ, thus our language is indeed an extension of the standard
modal language. Moreover, we will show that in the epistemic setting, this mention-some operator can
also express mention-all. By having the predicate symbols in the language, we can also talk about the
content of knowledge, which may be useful to bridge epistemic logic and knowledge representation. We
also believe that the new modality can be interpreted meaningfully not only in the epistemic context.
From a technical point of view, what we discovered is a well-behaved yet powerful fragment of first-
order modal logic (over arbitrary models), as the following main technical contributions of this paper
demonstrate:
• We propose a novel notion of bisimulation which can characterize the expressive power of our
language within first-order modal logic precisely, over arbitrary models.
• Over arbitrary models, satisfiability of the equality-free fragment is not only decidable but also
PSPACE-complete, just as the complexity of basic propositional modal logic, demonstrated by a
tableau-like method to show some strong finite-tree-model property.
• We give a sound and complete proof system to our logic over epistemic (S5) models with the
equivalence relation. However, we show that over S5 models, our logic is undecidable.
Due to historical and technical reasons, first-order modal logic (FOML), in particular in the epistemic
setting, has not been thoroughly studied as its propositional brother (cf. e.g., [6, 12, 39]). Decidable
fragments of first-order modal logic are usually obtained by restricting the occurrences of variables (par-
ticularly in the scope of ) (cf. e.g., [22, 23, 21, 3]). We hope our framework and techniques can pave a
new way to some interesting fragments of first-order modal logic, using new modalities to pack quanti-
fiers and standard modalities together, which also reflects the “secret of success” of basic propositional
modal logic as a nicely balanced logic between expressivity and complexity.
In the rest of this paper, we introduce the language and semantics of our framework in Section
2, study its expressivity over arbitrary models in Section 3, prove the complexity of the equality-free
fragment in Section 4, give the proof systems in the epistemic setting in Section 5, and prove their
completeness and undecidability in Section 6.
2 Syntax and Semantics
Throughout this paper we assume a fixed countably infinite set of variables X, and a fixed set of predicate
symbols P. Furthermore, we assume that each predicate symbol is associated with a unique non-negative
integer called its arity. We use x to denote a finite sequence of (distinct) variables in X, in the order of a
fix enumeration of X. By abusing the notation, we also view x as a set of variables in x occasionally. In
this paper, for the brevity of presentation, we focus on the following unimodal language, but the results
and techniques can be generalized to the polymodal language.4
3Note that this does not imply that we can simply use a single framework to cover all of those particular cases, since
the details of the semantics in each setting matter a lot in deciding the characteristic axioms and rules in each different setting.
Moreover, for example, in the setting of knowing how logics, we need to quantify over second-order objects (plans or strategies).
4We leave the discussion about the extension with constants or function symbols to the full version of the paper.
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Definition 2.1 (Language MLMS≈) Given X and P,
ϕ ::= x≈ y | Px | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) |xϕ
where x,y ∈ X, P ∈ P. We call the equality-free fragment MLMS (modal logic of mention-some).
xϕ can be read as knowing some x such that ϕ(x) in the epistemic context. We use the usual ab-
breviations >,⊥,∨,→, and write ♦x for ¬x¬, i.e., the dual of x. We define the free and bound
occurrences of variables as in first-order logic by viewing x as a quantifier. We call x is a free variable
in ϕ (x ∈ FV (ϕ)), if there is a free occurrence of x in ϕ . We write ϕ(x) if all the free variables in ϕ are
included in x. Given an MLMS≈ formula ϕ and x,y ∈ X, we write ϕ[y/x] for the formula obtained by
replacing every free occurrence of x by y. To simplify the discussion, we do not include constant symbols
and function symbols in the language and leave them to a future occasion.5.
As for the semantics, to be general enough, following [4, 45] we use the first-order Kripke model
with an increasing domain, and flesh out the intuitive idea of mention-some discussed in the introduction.
Definition 2.2 An (increasing domain) modelM for MLMS≈ is a tuple 〈W,D,δ ,R,ρ〉 where:
W is a non-empty set.
D is a non-empty set.
R ⊆W ×W is a binary relation over W.
δ : W → 2D assigns to each w ∈W a non-empty local domain s.t. wRv implies δ (w)⊆ δ (v) for any
w,v ∈W. We also write Dw for δ (w).
ρ : P×W → ⋃n∈ω 2Dn such that ρ assigns each n-ary predicate on each world an n-ary relation on
D.6
A constant domain model is a model such that Dw = D for any w ∈W. A finite model is a model with
both a finite W and a finite D. Given a model M , we denote its components as WM ,DM ,δM , RM ,
and ρM . To interpret free variables, we also need a variable assignment σ : X→ D. The formulas are
interpreted on models with variable assignments.
M ,w,σ  x≈ y ⇔ σ(x) = σ(y)
M ,w,σ  P(x1 · · ·xn) ⇔ (σ(x1), · · · ,σ(xn)) ∈ ρ(P,w)
M ,w,σ  ¬ϕ ⇔ M ,w,σ 2 ϕ
M ,w,σ  (ϕ ∧ψ) ⇔ M ,w,σ  ϕ andM ,w,σ  ψ
M ,w,σ  xϕ ⇔ there exists an a ∈ δ (w) such that
M ,v,σ [x 7→ a]  ϕ for all v s.t. wRv
where σ [x 7→ a] denotes another assignment just like σ except mapping x to a.
As an intuitive definition, following [24], we say ϕ is valid, if ϕ is true on any M ,w w.r.t. any σ such
that σ(x) ∈ δM (w) for all x ∈ X. Correspondingly, ϕ is satisfiable if ¬ϕ is not valid, i.e.,M ,w,σ  ϕ
for someM ,w and σ such that σ(x) ∈ δM (w) for all x ∈ X.
5Note that constant and functions can be coded using P and ≈ in full FOML≈ (cf. e.g., [24]). However, our language is a
fragment of FOML≈.
6Following [24, 6], we do not require that the interpretation of P at a world is based on the local domain. Actually, as we
will see later in Corollary 4.1, this seemingly ‘counterintuitive’ generalization does not affect the satisfiability or validity: each
satisfiable formula ϕ is satisfiable in a model where ρ(P,w) is based on objects in Dw (cf. also [24]).
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It is not hard to see that if σ(x) = σ ′(x) for all the free x in ϕ ,M ,w,σ  ϕ ⇔M ,w,σ ′  ϕ . In this
light, we writeM ,w  ϕ[a] to denoteM ,w,σ  ϕ(x) for any σ such that σ assigns free variables x of
ϕ the corresponding objects in a given |x|= |a|, where |·| denotes the length.
For comparison, the standard semantics for  is defined as:
M ,w,σ  ϕ ⇔ for all v such that wRvM ,v,σ  ϕ
Truth conditions of xϕ and ♦xϕ can then be defined using ,♦:
M ,w,σ  xϕ ⇔ there exists an a ∈ δ (w) such thatM ,w,σ [x 7→ a]  ϕ
M ,w,σ  ♦xϕ ⇔ for all a ∈ δ (w),M ,w,σ [x 7→ a]  ♦ϕ
It is now clear that ϕ is equivalent to xϕ where x 6∈ FV (ϕ). Therefore MLMS≈ can be viewed as an
extension of the basic propositional modal language. Therefore, in the context of MLMS≈, ϕ can be
viewed as an abbreviation. It also becomes evident that xϕ and ♦xϕ are essentially ∃xϕ and ∀x♦ϕ
in FOML≈ respectively. In the following we study the expressivity of MLMS≈ in comparison with
FOML≈.
3 Expressivity
Note that our semantics for x has the ∃∀ pattern which is similar to the neighbourhood semantics for
modal logic [24]. Moreover, MLMS≈ can be viewed as a fragment of the corresponding FOML≈.
Indeed, inspired by the world-object bisimulaion for FOML≈ [4, 45] and bisimulation for monotonic
neighbourhood modal logic [31, 18], we propose a novel notion of bisimulation for MLMS≈. Before
the formal definition, given a modelM , let D∗M be the set of (possibly empty) finite sequence of objects
in DM . A partial isomorphism between a ∈ D∗M and b ∈ D∗N such that |a| = |b| is an isomorphism
mapping ai to bi w.r.t. relevant interpretations of predicates (cf. e.g, [4]). It is partial since it is not about
all the objects in DM and DN .
Definition 3.1 (∃-Bisimulation) Given two models M and N , the relation Z ⊆ (WM ×D∗M )×
(WN ×D∗N ) is call an ∃-bisimulation, if for every ((w,a),(v,b)) ∈ Z such that |a|= |b| the following
holds (for brevity, comma in (w,a) is omitted):
PISO a and b form a partial isomorphism w.r.t. identity and interpretations of predicates at w and v
respectively.
∃Zig For any c ∈ DMw , there is a d ∈ DNv such that for any v′ ∈WN if vRv′ then there exists w′ in WM
such that wRw′ and w′acZv′bd.
∃Zag For any d ∈DNv , there is a c ∈DMw such that for any w′ ∈WM if wRw′ then there exists v′ in WN
such that vRv′ and w′acZv′bd.
We say M ,wa and N ,vb are ∃-bisimilar (M ,wa↔∃ N ,vb) if |a| = |b| and there is an ∃-
bisimulation linking wa and vb. In particular, we say M ,w and N ,v are ∃-bisimilar if M ,w↔∃
N ,v, i.e., when |a|= |b|= 0.
It is not hard to show that↔∃ is indeed an equivalence relation.
Note that our bisimulation notion is much weaker than isomorphism, in particular the domains of the
two bisimilar models do not necessarily have the same cardinality.
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Example 1 Consider the constant domain modelsM ,N :
M : w //
))
v : Pa N : s //
((
t : Pc
u : Pb r
where DM = {a,b}, DN = {c}, ρM (P,w) = ρN (P,s) = ρN (P,r) = /0, ρM (P,v) = {a}, ρM (P,u) =
{b}, ρN (P, t) = {c}. Suppose P is the only predicate, we can show that M ,w↔∃ N ,s by an ∃-
bisimulation Z (pay attention to the switch of the two models in the second half of the definitions of
∃Zig and ∃Zag):
{(w,s),(va, tc),(ub, tc),(vb,rc),(ua,rc)}
Also note that ∃Zig and ∃Zag hold trivially for wa and vb if w and v do not have any successor, based
on the fact that local domains are non-empty by definition.
We writeM ,wa≡MLMS≈ N ,vb if |a|= |b| and for all any MLMS≈ formula ϕ(x) such that |x|= |a|:
M ,w  ϕ[a]⇔N ,v  ϕ[b]. We can show that MLMS≈ is invariant under ∃-bisimilarity.
Theorem 3.1 M ,wa↔∃N ,vb thenM ,wa≡MLMS≈ N ,vb.
Proof: It suffices to prove that if Z is an ∃-bisimulation linking wa and vb such that |a| = |b|, then
M ,w  ϕ[a]⇔N ,v  ϕ[b]. Given a bisimulation Z, we do induction on the structure of ϕ . Supposing
ϕ is an atomic formula, due to PISO,M ,w  ϕ[a] iffN ,v  ϕ[b] for any atomic formula ϕ(x).
Suppose ϕ is in the shape of xψ(x) andM ,w  ϕ[a]. By the semantics there is a c ∈DMw such that
M ,w′  ψ[ac] for all the w′ such that wRw′. According to ∃Zig, there exists a d ∈ DNv such that the
second half of the condition holds. We claim thatN ,v′  ψ[bd] for any v′ such that vRv′. Suppose not,
then there is a v′ such thatN ,v′ 2 ψ[bd] and vRv′. Then according to ∃Zig, there is w′ such that wRw′
and w′acZv′bd. By IH,M ,w′ 2 ψ[ac]. Contradiction.
Corollary 3.1 M ,w↔∃N ,v then for any closed MLMS≈-formula ϕ: M ,w  ϕ ⇔N ,v  ϕ.
By the above invariance results, we can show that many natural combinations of quantifiers and modali-
ties are not expressible in MLMS≈.
Proposition 3.1 ∃xPx, ∃x♦Px and ♦∃xPx are not expressible in MLMS≈.
Proof: In this proof, we again consider constant domain models. For ∃xPx, consider the bisimilar
models in Example 1. ∃xPx holds onM ,w but not onN ,s, thus it is not expressible in MLMS≈. For
∃x♦Px and ♦∃xPx, consider:
M : w //
))
v : Pa N : s // t
u
where DM = {a,b}, DN = {c} as before, ρM (P,w)= ρM (P,u)= ρN (P, t)= ρN (P,s)= /0, ρM (P,v)=
{a}. Clearly, ∃x♦Px and ♦∃xPx are true at M ,w but false at N ,s. However, we can show that
M ,w↔∃N ,s by an ∃-bisimulation Z:
{(w,s),(ua, tc),(vb, tc),(ub, tc)}.
To precisely characterize MLMS≈ within the corresponding FOML≈, we need a notion of saturation.
In the following, we write Γ(x) if all the free variables in the set of MLMS≈-formulas Γ are included in
x. Inspired by [45], we can generalize the concept of m-saturation for propositional modal logic (cf. [5])
as follows:
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Definition 3.2 A model M is said to be ∃-saturated, if for any w ∈WM , and any finite sequence
a ∈ D∗M , the following two conditions are satisfied:
∃-type If for each finite subset ∆ of a set Γ(yx) where |y|= |a|,M ,w x∧∆[a],7 then there is a c ∈DMw
such thatM ,w  ϕ[ac] for all ϕ ∈ Γ, where x is assigned c.
♦-type If for each finite subset ∆ of Γ(x) such that |x|= |a|,M ,w  ♦∧∆[a], thenM ,w  ♦ϕ[a] for each
ϕ ∈ Γ.
Note that in the above definition, to simplify the presentation, we use ,♦ which are expressible in
MLMS≈. ♦-type condition is essentially the m-saturation adapted with variable assignments. Recall
that a finite model has a finite domain and finitely many worlds. It can be verified that:8
Proposition 3.2 Every finite model is ∃-saturated.
We can obtain the Hennessy-Milner-type theorem (cf. [5]) to establish the equality between ∃-
bisimilarity and MLMS≈-equivalence.
Theorem 3.2 For ∃-saturated modelsM ,N and |a|= |b|:
M ,wa↔∃N ,vb⇔M ,wa≡MLMS≈ N ,vb
Proof: Due to Theorem 3.1, we only need to show the right-to-left direction. We define Z = {(wa,vb) |
w ∈WM ,v ∈WN ,a ∈ D∗M ,b ∈ D∗N , |a| = |b|,M ,wa ≡MLMS≈ N ,vb}. We need to show that Z is an
∃-bisimulation. PISO is straightforward as a and b are finite and partial isomorphism between them
can be expressed by atomic formulas. We only show ∃Zig since ∃Zag is similar. Assuming waZvb
and there is a c ∈ DMw . Let Γ = {ϕ(yx) | w  ϕ[ac], |y| = |a|}. Now for any finite set ∆ ⊆ Γ we have
w  x∧∆[a]. Since wa ≡MLMS≈ vb, v  x∧∆[b]. Now by ∃-type condition, we know there is a
d ∈ DNv such that v  ϕ[bd] for all ϕ ∈ Γ (?). Now take an arbitrary v′ such that vRv′, we show there
is a w′ such that wRw′ and w′ac ≡MLMS≈ v′bd. Let Σ = {ϕ(x) |N ,v′  ϕ[bd], |x| = |bd|}. It is clear
that for each finite set ∆ ⊆ Σ, v  ♦∧∆[bd], namely v  ¬¬∧∆[bd]. We can show w  ¬¬∧∆[ac].
Suppose not, then w ¬∧∆[ac], thus ¬∧∆ ∈ Γ. By (?), v ¬∧∆[bd], which is in contradiction with
v  ¬¬∧∆[bd]. Now it is clear that w  ♦∧∆[ac] for each finite ∆ ⊆ Σ. By the ♦-type condition of
∃-saturation, there is a successor w′ of w such that w′  Σ[ac]. Therefore w′ac ≡MLMS≈ v′bd, namely
(w′ac,v′bd) ∈ Z. This completes the proof for ∃Zig.
Corollary 3.2 For finite models: M ,wa↔∃N ,vb⇔M ,wa≡MLMS≈N ,vb. For ∃-saturated mod-
els: M ,w↔∃N ,v⇔M ,w andN ,v satisfies the same closed MLMS≈-formulas (sentences).
Now we can characterize MLMS≈ in the corresponding first-order language.
Definition 3.3 Given X,P as before, the corresponding FOML≈ language is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= x≈ y | Px | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ∀xϕ |ϕ
The corresponding two-sorted first-order language 2SFOL≈ is:
ϕ ::= x≈ y | Qux | Ruv | Eux | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ∀xϕ | ∀uϕ
where x,y ∈ X and u,v ∈ Y which is a collection of world variables disjoint from X; Q ∈ Q and Q is the
smallest collection of predicate symbols such that for each n-ary P ∈ P there is a unique QP ∈Q with the
arity n+1. E is a new predicate symbol to say which object exists on which world.
7Here we require y are assigned a correspondingly. This is only to avoid introducing extended language with constants for
a as in standard model theory, since we did not define interpretation for constant symbols. Similarly below.
8Due to limited space, we omit some proofs and leave them to the extended version of this conference paper.
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It is trivial to define a translation r from MLMS≈ to the corresponding FOML≈ by setting r(xϕ) =
∃xr(ϕ). It is clear that this translation is truth preserving. To translate MLMS≈ into the formulas in
the corresponding 2SFOL≈ (with u,v as the only world variables), we define the following tu inspired
by [4]:
Definition 3.4 (Translation from MLMS≈ to 2SFOL≈)
tu(x≈ y) = x≈ y tu(Px) = QP(u,x)
tu(¬ψ) = ¬tu(ψ) tu(ϕ ∧ψ) = tu(ϕ)∧ tu(ψ).
tu(xψ) = ∃x(Eux∧∀v(Ruv→ tv(ψ))
tv is defined symmetrically, by swapping u and v.
In this way, every MLMS≈-formula is translated into a two-world-variable formula of 2SFOL≈ with
one free variable, similar to the standard translation of basic modal language to first-order language.
We can also view a model for MLMS≈ as a model for 2SFOL≈ by turning ρ(w,P) into the interpre-
tation of the corresponding QP in the most natural way. It is not hard to show:
Proposition 3.3 For any MLMS≈ formula ϕ:
M ,w,σ  ϕ ⇔M ,σ ′  tu(ϕ)
where σ ′ is σ extended by u 7→ w,  is the standard semantics for 2SFOL≈ (cf. e.g. [6]).
It follows from the compactness of 2SFOL≈ that:9
Proposition 3.4 MLMS≈ is compact.
Based on Theorem 3.2 and the compactness of MLMS≈, it is relatively routine to prove the van-
Benthem-like characterization theorem using the strategy in [4, 5], which makes use of ω-saturation
in first-order model theory. We omit the proof due to limited space.
Theorem 3.3 A 2SFOL≈-formula ϕ(xu) is equivalent to an MLMS≈-formula (over MLMS≈-models)
iff it is invariant under ∃-bisimilarity.
Since any FOML≈ formula can also be viewed as a 2SFOL≈ formula ϕ(xu), via a natural translation
like tu (cf. [6, 45]), it follows that:
Corollary 3.3 A FOML≈-formula is equivalent to an MLMS≈-formula iff it is invariant under ∃-
bisimilarity.
4 Satisfiability of MLMS
Note that by tu we can translate an MLMS≈ formula to an equivalent 2SFOL≈ formula, and eventually
to a FOL≈ formula with one free world variable u (see Footnote 9). For example xPx becomes
ϕ(u) = ∃x(S1x∧S2u∧Eux∧∀v((S2v∧Ruv)→ QPvx))
92SFOL≈ inherits the compactness from first-order logic since there is a truth preserving translation from 2SFOL≈ to
FOL≈ by using two new unary predicates S1, S2 for the two sorts, together with a single unrestricted quantifiers to mimic the
two-sorted quantifiers. Note that we can also express the constraints on the sorts in FOL≈ by θ(S1,S2) = ∀x((S1x∨ S2x)∧
¬(S1x∧S2x)).
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in the corresponding FOL≈ language. Note that since we only consider increasing domain models, ϕ is
equivalent to
ϕ(u) = ∃x(S1x∧S2u∧Eux∧∀v((S2v∧Ruv∧Evx)→ QPvx))
which is in the (loosely) guarded fragment of first-order logic known to be decidable [1]. However, it
does not directly imply that our logic is decidable, since, for example, to capture the increasing domain
model we do need the following first-order constraint:
χ = ∀u∀v∀x((S2u∧S2v∧S1x∧Eux∧Ruv)→ Evx)
χ can be viewed as some form of transitivity, and it is not in the guarded fragment, since v and x are free in
the consequent but they do not co-exist in any of the atomic guards in the antecedent. On the other hand,
such a transitivity-like constrained predicate E only appears in the guards of the translations of MLMS≈-
formulas, which may be handled by the techniques in [37] for the guarded fragment with transitive guards
known to be decidable. We leave the detailed discussion connecting MLMS≈ to guarded fragments to a
future occasion.
In this section, we give an intuitive tableau-like method to decide whether an equality-free MLMS-
formula is satisfiable, inspired by the satisfiability games for various temporal logics [13, 27].10
For the ease of presentation, we consider the following equivalent language of MLMS in positive
normal form (PNF), where negations only appear with atomic formulas:11
ϕ ::= Px | ¬Px | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | (ϕ ∨ϕ) |xϕ | ♦xϕ
Note that for an arbitrary MLMS-formula ϕ , we can rewrite it into an equivalent formula in PNF by the
following rewriting rules and the replacement of equals:
r(¬(ϕ ∧ψ)) = r(¬ϕ)∨ r(¬ψ) r(¬xϕ) = ♦xr(¬ϕ) r(¬¬ϕ) = r(ϕ)
Note that |r(ϕ)| ≤ 2|ϕ|.
In the following, we will focus on the formulas that are clean in the sense that no variable occurs
both free and bound,12 and no two distinct occurrences of modalities bind the same variable. As in first-
order logic, it is easy to show that any MLMS formula can be relettered into an equivalent clean formula
with the same length, by renaming the bounded variables. We define the following tableau rules for all
MLMS formaulas in PNF.
Definition 4.1 Tableau rules
w : ϕ1∨ϕ2,Γ,σ
w : ϕ1,Γ,σ | w : ϕ2,Γ,σ (∨)
w : ϕ1∧ϕ2,Γ,σ
w : ϕ1,ϕ2,Γ,σ
(∧)
Given n≥ 0,m≥ 1:
w :x1ϕ1, . . . ,xnϕn,♦y1ψ1, . . . ,♦ymψm, l1 . . . lk,σ
{(wvyyi : {ϕ j | 1≤ j ≤ n},ψi[y/yi],σ ′) | y ∈ Dom(σ ′), i ∈ [1,m]}
(BR)
Given n≥ 1,k ≥ 0:
w :x1ϕ1, . . . ,xnϕn, l1 . . . lk,σ
w : l1 . . . lk,σ
(END)
where σ ′ = σ ∪{(x j,x j) | j ∈ [1,n]} and lk ∈ lit (the literals).
10See [33, 10] for tableau methods for first-order modal logic in general.
11PNF is often used in automata-theoretical methods to satisfiability problems of logics in computer science (cf. e.g., [34,
27]).
12 In particular, if x or ♦x appears in the formula then x does not have any free occurrence, even when x and ♦x do not
bind any occurrence of x, e.g., (xPy)∧Px is not clean.
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Those rules are used to generate tree-like structure, where the nodes are triples (w,Γ,σ) in which w is
some name to denote a world, Γ is a finite set of MLMS-formulas, and σ is a partial function from X to
X as an assignment. Note that Rule (∨) is essentially a choice: given the numerator, you can only select
one of the denominator to continue. On the other hand, the rule (BR) is a branching one, which generates
all the nodes in the denominator set (even when n = 0 i.e., the x-part is empty). It is a generalized
version of the corresponding rule for basic modal logic (cf. [27]):
w :ϕ,♦ψ, l1 . . . ll
v : ϕ,ψ
The idea is that if there is a diamond formula then we need to generate a successor while keeping the
information given by -formulas. Here the complication is to manage the variable assignment properly.
Note that if there are merely x-formulas without any ♦x-formula, then we do not need to generate any
successor, as captured by the rule END.
A tableau starting from (w : Γ,σ) is a tree where the successors of a node are generated by applying
the rules, until no rule is applicable. Recall that you can only select one of the denominators to continue
when applying (∨). Below is an example of a tableau where the (partial) function σ is represented by a
set of ordered pairs:
w : {x(Px∨Qx)∧♦y¬Qy∧¬Pz,{(z,z)} (∧)×2
w : {x(Px∨Qx),♦y¬Qy,¬Pz}{(z,z)} (BR)
wvxy : {Px∨Qx,¬Qx},{(x,x),(z,z)} (∨)
wvxy : {Px,¬Qx},{(x,x),(z,z)}
wvzy : {Px∨Qx,¬Qz},{(x,x),(z,z)}
wvzy : {Qx,¬Qz},{(x,x),(z,z)}
Intuitively, (∨) and (∧) will ‘decompose’ the formula until BR is applicable. It is not hard to see
that all the leaf nodes are in the shape of (w : l1 . . . lk,σ). Moreover, any tableau starting from (w : Γ,σ),
where Γ and σ are finite, is a finite tree, both in depth and width, since we only generate simpler formulas
by the rules and the domain of the assignment is always finite. A tableau is called open if all its branches
do not contain contradictions of literals at the same world, i.e. no Px and ¬Px appear together.
Given a tableau T , we say a node (w : Γ,σ) is a branching node if it is branching due to the appli-
cation of BR. We call (w : Γ,σ) the last node of w, if it is a leaf node or a branching node. Clearly, given
a w appearing in a tableau T , the last node of w always uniquely exists, since we always only select one
of the denominators for the rule (∨). We denote the last node of w in a given T as tw. Let
Dom(tw) =
{
Dom(σ ′) if tw is branching
Dom(σ) otherwise
where σ is the assignment in tw and σ ′ is the assignment defined as in BR w.r.t. tw.
Actually, the open tableaux are pseudo models.
Theorem 4.1 For any clean MLMS-formula θ in PNF, the following are equivalent:
• There is an open tableau from
(r : {θ},σr = {(x,x) | x is free in θ}∪{(z,z)})
where z ∈ X and it does not appear in θ .
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• θ is satisfiable in an increasing domain model.
Proof: Before the main proof, we need the following handy observations about any tableau T starting
from (r,{θ},σr) where θ is clean. For any node (v : Γ,σ) in T , we claim:
(1) If x (♦x) occurs in Γ, then it only occurs once and there is no ♦x (x) occurring in Γ.
(2) For all x ∈ Dom(σ), x and ♦x do not appear in Γ, thus all the occurrences of x in Γ are free.
(3) All the free variables x in Γ are in Dom(σ).
(4) If xϕ,yψ ∈ Γ then y is not a free variable in ϕ .
(5) If xϕ,♦yψ ∈ Γ then y is not a free variable in ϕ and x is not a free variable in ψ .
(6) For any x in Dom(σ), σ(x) = x.
(1): We prove it by induction on the structure of T from the root: it is true for the clean formula θ by
definition, and all the rules preserve this property since they never add any new occurrences of modalities.
(2): Again, we prove it by induction from the root: at the root the claim is true by the definition
of σr and the cleanness of θ (cf. also Footnote 12). Moreover, all the rules preserve this property. In
particular, for the rule (BR), by induction hypothesis, for any variable x ∈Dom(σ), it only occurs free in
the formulas of the numerator. Thus the occurrences of x ∈ Dom(σ), if any, are also free in any ϕ j and
ψi[y/yi] which have less modalities to bind than the numerator. Now for x ∈Dom(σ ′)\Dom(σ), i.e., x
appears in the numerator, the statement also holds by Claim (1), since there is only one occurrence of
any modality for such an x in the numerator.
(3): Again, we can show by induction: Dom(σr) has all the free variables in θ , and all the rules
preserve this property. For the rule (BR), we need to check the free variables in those ϕ j and ψi. Note
that the only possible extra free variable in ϕ j but not inx jϕ j is x j but it is already included in Dom(σ ′).
The only possible extra free variable in ψi[y/yi] but not in ♦yiψi is y which is also already in Dom(σ ′).
(4): Towards contradiction, suppose xϕ,yψ ∈ Γ, but y is a free variable in ϕ . According to Claim
(3) y ∈ Dom(σ), then by Claim (2), y does not appear in Γ, which is in contradiction with yψ ∈ Γ.
(5): Similarly to (4).
(6): Obvious, by definition.
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem.
From top to bottom: Given an open tableau T from the root node (r : ϕ,σr), we define M =
〈W,D,δ ,R,ρ〉 where:
• W = {w | (w,Γ,σ) appears in T for some Γ and σ}
• wRv iff v = wv′ for some v′.
• δ (w) = Dom(tw)
• D =⋃w∈W δ (w)
• x ∈ ρ(w,P) iff the atomic formula Px appears in tw.
where tw is the last node of w in T , as defined before.
According to the rule (BR) and the definition of δ ,M is indeed an increasing domain model.13 Since
(z,z) ∈Dom(σr), Dw is not empty for any w ∈W . Moreover ρ is well-defined due to the openness of T .
Note that due to Claim (3), if the atomic formula Px appears in tw then x⊆ Dw. We will show thatM ,r
is indeed a model of θ w.r.t. σr.
13Note that it does not mean Dw is everywhere the same due to branching nodes in T .
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From Claim (3), if (w : Γ,σ) appears in T , then all the free variables are in Dom(σ) ⊆ Dw =
Dom(tw), thus it makes sense to ask whether M ,w,σ  Γ (the assignment to the bound variables are
irrelevant for the truth of formulas in Γ). To prove that M ,w,σ  Γ for all nodes (w : Γ,σ) in T , we
do induction on the nodes of T in a bottom-up fashion from leaf nodes, by following the the rules
conversely.
Leaf For leaf nodes (w : l1, . . . , lk,σ), by definition of ρ , the statement holds based on the fact that
σ(x) = x for all the free variable x in those literals by Claims (3), (6).
END SupposingM ,w,σ  l1∧ ·· ·∧ lk, then it is clear thatM ,w,σ  x1ϕ1∧ ·· ·∧xnϕn∧ l1∧ ·· ·∧ lk
since there is no outgoing transition from w, and Dw is not empty.
∨, ∧ Obvious.
BR SupposeM ,wvyyi ,σ ′  ψi[y/yi]∧
∧n
1ϕ j for every y ∈ Dom(σ ′) and i ∈ [1,m], and (w : Γ,σ) is the
branching predecessor where
Γ= {x jϕ j | j ∈ [1,n]}∪{♦yiψi | i ∈ [1,m]}∪{lh | h ∈ [1,k]}.
Note that Dw = Dom(tw) = Dom(σ ′). We need to show thatM ,w,σ  Γ. The lh part is as in the
case of the leaf nodes. For x jϕ j, let x j ∈ Dom(σ ′) = Dw be the witness, we need to show that at
all the successors wvyyi of w, M ,wv
y
yi ,σ [x j 7→ x j]  ϕ j . Now by Claim (4), all xk such that k 6= j
are not free in ϕ j. From the induction hypothesis (IH) thatM ,wvyyi ,σ ′  ϕ j for each wv
y
yi , and the
fact that σ [x j 7→ x j] and σ ′ agree on the free variables in ϕ j, we know M ,wvyyi ,σ [x j 7→ x j]  ϕ j
for each wvyyi . ThusM ,w,σ  x jϕ j.
As for each ♦yiψi, we show that for each y ∈Dw = Dom(σ ′),M ,wvyyi ,σ [yi 7→ y]  ψi. Note that y
might be not in Dom(σ). By the IH,M ,wvyyi ,σ ′  ψi[y/yi]. Since σ ′ assigns y to y, we just need
to show that σ [yi 7→ y] and σ ′ agree on all the free variables in ψi[y/yi] except y. Note that yi is
not a free variable in ψi[y/yi], therefore the only possible differences between σ [yi 7→ y] and σ ′
are about those x j where x j 6= y. By Claim (5), we know that x j is not a free variable in ψi[y/yi] if
x j 6= y. ThereforeM ,wvyyi ,σ [yi 7→ y]  ψi for each y ∈ Dw, thusM ,w,σ  ♦yiψi for each i.
It follows thatM ,r,σr  θ .
Now from bottom to top: We just need to show that the rule applications preserve the satisfiability
of the formula set. Note that for (∨) it suffices to show one outcome node is still satisfiable. In this way,
there is an open tableau since if the formula sets at the leaf nodes and branching nodes are satisfiable,
then there is no contradiction among the literals. It is obvious that (∧) and (END) preserves satisfiability,
and one of the denominator of ∨ preserves it too. We now show that BR also does so. Supposing
Γ= {x1ϕ1, . . . ,xnϕn,♦y1ψ1, . . . ,♦ymψm, l}, in some branching node (w : Γ,σ), is satisfiable, then there
is a modelM ,w and an assignment η such that η(x) ∈ Dw for all x ∈ X and:
M ,w,η  {x1ϕ1, . . . ,xnϕn,♦y1ψ1, . . . ,♦ymψm} (◦)
By the semantics, we know there are a1, . . . ,an ∈Dw, such that for all the successors v of w: M ,v,η [x j 7→
a j]  ϕ j. Due to Claim (4), each x j is not free in ϕk for k 6= j thus we can safely obtain for all successor
v of w:
M ,v,η [x 7→ a]  {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn}. (A)
Now also by (◦) and the semantics for ♦yi , for each ψi and each b ∈ Dw, there is a successor vbi of w
such that
M ,vbi ,η [yi 7→ b]  ψi (B)
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From Claim (5), yi is not one of x j. Now from (A) and (B), we have for each ψi and each b ∈ Dw,
there is a successor vbi of w such that:
M ,vbi ,η [x 7→ a,yi 7→ b]  {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψi} (?)
Now consider any y ∈Dom(σ ′) as in the denominator of the rule BR, we need to show {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψi[y/
yi]} is satisfiable. Suppose that y ∈Dom(σ ′) and η(y) = b ∈Dw. By Claim (2), y is free in ψi[y/yi], thus
by (?):
M ,vbi ,η [x 7→ a]  {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψi[y/yi]}
Therefore, {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψi[y/yi]} is satisfiable for each y∈Dom(σ ′). This completes the whole proof.
A strong finite tree property then follows: 14
Corollary 4.1 If an MLMS-formula ϕ (with length n) is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a finite tree
modelM ,w, w.r.t. an assignment σ such that |WM | ≤ n4n, |DM | ≤ n, ρ(P,w) ⊆ Dkw (if P is k-ary), the
depth of the tree is bounded by 2|ϕ|, and σ(x) ∈ DMw for each free variable x in ϕ .
The upper bound for the depth of the tree comes from the bound on the length of the PNF of ϕ . The (very
loose) upper bound on the size of WM comes from the fact that each node in the tableau may contain up
to n modalities and each modality may have n-successors (due to the size of the domain), and the depth
of the tableau is up to 2n. As in normal modal logic [5, Ch. 6], we can force a binary branching tree by
an MLMS-formula to get an exponential-sized model.
Theorem 4.2 Satisfiability problem of MLMS-formulas is PSPACE-complete.
Proof:(Sketch) Note that standard modal logic formulas can be translated into our MLMS by using 0-ary
predicate P for each propositional letter. For example, ♦p can be translated as x♦yP. The PSPACE-
hardness then follows since satisfiability for basic normal modal logic is PSPACE-complete [5]. For
the upper bound, note that to rewrite a formula into PNF and to reletter the formula into a clean shape
are efficient in space, and the length of the resulting formula is still linear in the length of the original
formula. From then on, a standard PSPACE-algorihm traversing a tree structure including all the the
possible ∨-branches suffices, as in standard modal logic, with some care about efficiently encoding the
descriptions of each node and the result of the consistent checking.
Remark 1 Our notion of the tableaux is closely related to two-player satisfiability games and alternating-
tree automata [14], which will give us the algorithmic tools for MLMS in the future.
We conjecture that a similar tableau method would work for MLMS≈, with more careful assignment
management by selecting representatives of provably equivalent variables w.r.t. ≈ as the local domain.
We leave it to the extended version of the paper.
5 A new epistemic logic
In this session, we go back to the motivating epistemic setting, and give a complete axiomatization of
our logic over epistemic models.
14Interested readers may go back to Footnote 6.
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5.1 Epistemic language
To ease the presentation of the proof system, we also include the standard modality  as a primitive
modality in the following language MLMSK≈:15
ϕ ::= x≈ y | Px | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) |ϕ |xϕ
Recall that MLMSK≈ is equally expressive as MLMS≈. In the epistemic setting, the intended reading
of ϕ is i knows that ϕ , and the intended reading of xϕ is that i knows something such that ϕ . The
semantics is as before, but we have two extra conditions on the model:
• Each R is an equivalence relation as in (idealized) standard epistemic logic S5. We also write ∼
for R.
• For all w ∈W , Dw = D.
Note that for an increasing domain modelM , if R is an equivalence relation, then for any two worlds w,v
such that wRv, we have Dw = Dv. Therefore, we can simply assume that there is a constant domain over
the whole model.16 We also call such models S5-models, following the terminology in epistemic logic.
ϕ ∈MLMSK≈ is valid if for any pointed S5-model M ,w, any assignment σ , M ,w,σ  ϕ. Note that
in constant domain models, we no longer need to give the restriction on the assignment: σ(x) ∈ D = Dw
for all assignment σ , all w ∈WM and all x ∈ X.
MLMSK≈ over S5-models is a quite powerful language. As we mentioned, the semantics for x is
in line with the mention-some reading. We can also introduce a modal operator x based on mention-all
semantics as below:
M ,w,σ  xϕ ⇔ for each d ∈ D, eitherM ,w,σ [x 7→ d]  ϕ orM ,w,σ [x 7→ d]  ¬ϕ
Intuitively, xϕ means for all objects in the constant domain D, the agent knows whether ϕ , e.g., I know
who came to the party means that for each person in concern, I know whether (s)he came or not. In
terms of FOML≈, xϕ is essentially ∀x(ϕ ∨¬ϕ). Note that x and x not only differ only in the
quantifiers. On the other hand, the natural ∀-version of x is defined:
M ,w,σ  ∀xϕ ⇔ for each d ∈ D,M ,w,σ [x 7→ d]  ϕ
M ,w,σ  ∀xϕ only says that of each object, the agent knows that it satisfies property ϕ(x), which
differs from the semantics of the mention-all operator.
There is also a very natural generalization of our mention-some operator with multiple variables: x:
M ,w,σ  x1···xnϕ ⇔ there exist d1, · · · ,dn ∈ D such thatM , t,σ [x 7→ d]  ϕ
Proposition 5.1 x,∀x, and x can all be defined in MLMSK≈ over S5-models:
Proof: The following equivalences are valid for any MLMSK≈-formula ϕ , based on the fact that
♦ϕ ↔ϕ and ϕ ↔ϕ are valid on S5 models:
• xϕ ↔ (♦x(ϕ ∨¬ϕ))
• ∀xϕ ↔ ♦xϕ
• xϕ ↔x1 · · ·xnϕ
15In the axiomatization we will make use of . If we do not introduce them explicitly then every time we need to use xϕ
where x is not free in ϕ .
16Without the condition of constant domain, different partitions w.r.t. ∼ may still have different local domains.
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5.2 Proof system
In the rest of this section we propose a Hilbert-style proof system for the equality-free MLMSK and
then extend it to a proof system for MLMSK≈.
First note that the following “K axiom” for x is not valid on S5-models, since the witnesses object
for x in x(ϕ → ψ) and xϕ may be different:
x(ϕ → ψ)→ (xϕ →xψ)
Therefore the modal logic of MLMSK is not normal, as expected. We propose the following proof
system:
System SMLMSK
Axioms
TAUT all axioms of propositional logic
DISTK (ϕ → ψ)→ (ϕ →ψ)
T ϕ → ϕ
4MS xϕ →xϕ
5MS ¬xϕ →¬xϕ
KtoMS (ϕ[y/x])→xϕ (if ϕ[y/x] is admissible)
MStoK xϕ →ϕ (if x 6∈ FV (ϕ))
MStoMSK xϕ →xϕ
KT >
Rules:
MP
ϕ,ϕ → ψ
ψ
MONOMS
` ϕ → ψ
`xϕ →xψ
where ϕ[y/x] is admissible if no free occurrence of x in ϕ is in the scope of a modality binding y.
The axioms are quite intuitive as they are, but they can be understood even more easily if we put
them in some context to give concrete intuitive readings. For example, supposing we use xϕ(x) to
express that the agent knows how to achieve ϕ , then 4MS, 5MS express the (idealised) introspections of
such goal-directed know-how: if you know how then you know you know how, and if you do not know
how then you know you do not; KtoMS says that if you know that a particular way can achieve ϕ for
sure, then you know how to achieve ϕ; MStoK trivializes know-how to know-that, if x is irrelevant to ϕ;
MStoMSK says that if you know how to achieve ϕ then you know how to ensure that you know ϕ; KT says
we know tautologies;17 and MONOMS is the monotonicity rule for know-how.
Remark 2 Actually, all the above axioms have incarnations in the logic system SKH of know-how
proposed in [9]. Modulo the replacement of the know-how operator Kh by x, all the axioms and rules
in SKH are derivable in SMLMSK, except the composition axiom KhKhtoKh (KhKhϕ → Khϕ), which
indeed captures the characteristic feature about know-how: the witness strategies can be composed.
It is routine to verify the soundness, assuming the familiarity of first-order modal logic over S5-
models.
Theorem 5.1 SMLMSK is sound over S5 models.
SMLMSK is very powerful, as demonstrated by the following proposition: many usual “suspects” can
be derived.
17This is a technical axiom to recover the necessitation rule for K from MONOMS. Alternatively, we can also just include the
necessitation rule for  instead of KT.
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Proposition 5.2 The following theorems are derivable and the rules are admissible in SMLMSK:
MSKtoMS xϕ →xϕ MStotK ϕ ↔xϕ (x 6∈ FV (ϕ))
NECK
` ϕ
`ϕ NECMS
` ϕ
`xϕ
RE
` ϕ ↔ ψ
` χ(ψ)↔ χ(ϕ) RKtoMS
`ϕ → ψ
`xϕ → ψ (x 6∈ FV (ψ))
MST x> RMS xϕ ↔yϕ[y/x] (y is not in ϕ))
4 ϕ →ϕ 5 ¬ϕ →¬ϕ
Proof:(Sketch) MSKtoMS is based on T and MONOMS. ϕ →xϕ is a special case of KtoMS when y = x.
Together with MStoK we have MStotK. Now from KT and MStotK we have MST. Then based on KT
and MST, NECMS and NECK follow from MONOMS. The rule of Replacement of Equals (RE) can be proved
inductively based on MONOMS. RKtoMS is based on MONOMS, MStoMSK, MStotK and T. The standard
introspection axioms of  are special instances of inspection axioms 4MS and 5MS based on MStotK
and RE.18 Let us now look at RMS, which is the renaming axiom for bound variables. Right-to-left
can be derived by starting with KtoMS: ` (ϕ[y/x])→ xϕ , then since y does not appear in ϕ , we
have ` y(ϕ[y/x]) → xϕ by RKtoMS. For the other direction, note that ϕ = (ϕ[y/x])[x/y] if y is
not in ϕ . Then since (ϕ[y/x])[x/y] is admissible, by KtoMS, ` (ϕ[y/x])[x/y]→ yϕ[y/x], namely
`ϕ →yϕ[y/x]. Then by RKtoMS, `xϕ →yϕ[y/x].
Remark 3 Now we know that the S5 system of is a subsystem of SMLMSK. We may also view KtoMS,
RKtoMS as analogues of the following axiom and rule respectively in first-order logic:
∀xϕ → ϕ[y/x] ` ϕ → ψ` ϕ →∀xψ (x 6∈ FV (ϕ))
RE is the rule of replacement and RMS allows us to reletter the bound variables, as in FOL≈. Moreover,
the Barcan formula (∀xϕ →∀xϕ), over S5-models, can be expressed as:
♦xϕ →♦xϕ
which is also derivable in SMLMSK due to 5MS.
The following provable formula plays a role in the later completeness proof.
Proposition 5.3 `SMLMSK (xϕ →ψ)→(xϕ →ψ).
Proof: Consider the contrapositive of the formula to be proved: ♦(xϕ ∧¬ψ)→ (xϕ ∧¬ψ). It
is routine to show that ` ♦(xϕ ∧¬ψ)→ (♦xϕ ∧♦¬ψ). Now by 5MS, 4, and T, ` ♦xϕ ↔xϕ
and ` ♦¬ψ ↔¬ψ . Therefore, by RE, ` ♦(xϕ ∧¬ψ)→ (xϕ ∧¬ψ).
In the following we define the Hilbert system SMLMSK≈ for MLMSK≈ by extending SMLMSK with
the following two extra axiom schemata:
Axioms
ID x≈ x
SUBID x≈ y→ (ϕ → ψ) if ϕ and ψ only differ in that
some free occurrences of x in one formula
are replaced by free occurrences of y in another.
184MS can also be derived from T and 5MS in the system SMLMSK like in the case of propositional S5 system.
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Theorem 5.2 SMLMSK≈ is sound.
It is routine to show:
Proposition 5.4 The following are provable in SMLMSK≈ :
SYM x≈ y→ y≈ x TRANS x≈ y∧ y≈ z→ x≈ z
KEQ x≈ y→(x≈ y) KNEQ x 6≈ y→(x 6≈ y)
Proof: SYM and TRANS are due to SUBID. To derive KEQ, we first have ` (x ≈ x) by ID and NECK. By
SUBID we have ` x≈ y→ ((x≈ y)→(x≈ x)). Therefore KEQ is provable.
For KNEQ, from KEQ we have `♦x 6≈ y→ x 6≈ y, thus `♦x 6≈ y→x 6≈ y by NECK and DISTK. Note
that ϕ→♦ϕ is derivable by T and 5MS. Therefore by taking ϕ = x 6≈ y and using MP we have ` KNEQ.
6 Completeness
Let us first focus on the completeness of SMLMSK without axioms for equalities.
We first extend the language of MLMSK with countably infinitely many new variable symbols. Call
the new language MLMSK+ and the variable set X+. In the following, we say a set of formulas is
SMLMSK+-consistent if it is SMLMSK-consistent w.r.t. the extended language MLMSK+.
Definition 6.1 A set of MLMSK+ formulas has ∃-property if for each xϕ ∈MLMSK+ it contains a
“witness” formula xϕ →ϕ[y/x] for some y ∈ X+ where ϕ[y/x] is admissible.
Definition 6.2 (Canonical model for SMLMSK+) The canonical model is a tuple 〈W c,Dc,∼c,ρc〉
where:
• W c is the set of maximal SMLMSK+-consistent sets with ∃-property,
• Dc = X+,
• s∼c t iff (s)⊆ t where (s) := {ϕ |ϕ ∈ s},
• x ∈ ρc(P,s) iff Px ∈ s.
It is routine to show that ∼c is an equivalence relation, by using axioms T, 4, and 5.
Lemma 6.1 If ψ 6∈ s ∈W c then there exists a t ∈W c such that s∼c t and ¬ψ ∈ t.
Proof: It is routine in normal modal logic to show that if ψ 6∈ s then (s)∪{¬ψ} is consistent. Now
we show that (s)∪{¬ψ} can be extended to an SMLMSK+-maximal consistent set with ∃-property.
We follow the general strategy in [24] by adding witness formulas one by one.
Let θ0 = ¬ψ . We enumerate x-formulas as: x1ϕ1,x2ϕ2, . . . We define θk+1 as the formula:
θk∧ (xk+1ϕk+1→ϕk+1[y/xk+1])
where y is the first variable in a fixed enumeration of X+ such that ϕk+1[y/xk+1] is admissible and
xk+1ϕk+1→ϕk+1[y/xk+1] is consistent with {θk}∪(s).
We now show that such θk+1 always exists (i.e., such a y exists), if {θk}∪(s) is consistent. Towards
a contradiction, suppose that {θk}∪(s) is consistent but there is no such a y, i.e., for each y ∈X+ such
that ϕk+1[y/xk+1] is admissible there are χ1, . . . ,χn ∈(s) such that
` χ1∧·· ·∧χn→ ((xk+1ϕk+1→ϕk+1[y/xk+1])→¬θk).
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By NECK and DISTK and the fact thatχi ∈ s for 1≤ i≤ n, it is routine to show that((xk+1ϕk+1→
ϕ+1[y/xk+1])→¬θk) is also in s. By DISTK again,
(xk+1ϕk+1→ϕk+1[y/xk+1])→¬θk (?)
is in s for all y such that ϕk+1[y/x] is admissible.
Note that s has the ∃-property, therefore, xk+1ϕk+1 → ϕk+1[y∗/x] is in s for some particular y∗
such that ϕk+1[y∗/xk+1] is admissible. By Proposition 5.3, (xk+1ϕk+1→ ϕk+1[y∗/xk+1]) is in s. By
(?), we have ¬θk is in s, thus ¬θk ∈(s) which is in contradiction with that {θk}∪(s) is consistent.
Now since {θ0}∪(s) = {¬ψ}∪(s) is consistent, we can indeed construct all the θk. Let Γ =
{θk | k ∈ N}∪(s). Γ is consistent and the ∃-property is essentially built-in. We can then extend it into
an SMLMSK+-maximal consistent set t. It then follows that s∼c t and ¬ϕ ∈ t.
Now comes the truth lemma.
Lemma 6.2 Let σ∗ be the assignment such that σ∗(x) = x for all x ∈ X+. For any ϕ ∈MLMSK+, any
s ∈W c:
M c,s,σ∗  ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ s
Proof: We do induction on the structure of the formula ϕ .
Px By the definition of ρc and σ∗, it is obvious.
Bool Boolean cases are trivial.
ψ Routine, based on Lemma 6.1.
xψ Supposing xψ ∈ s, by ∃-property of s there exists ψ[y/x] ∈ s for some y such that ψ[y/x] is
admissible. By 4, ψ[y/x] ∈ s. Supposing s ∼c t, we have ψ[y/x] ∈ t due to the definition
of ∼c. By T, ψ[y/x] ∈ t. By IH, M , t,σ∗  ψ[y/x]. Due to the definition of σ∗ and the fact that
ψ[y/x] is admissible,M , t,σ∗[x 7→ y] ψ for all t ∼ s. ThusM ,s,σ∗[x 7→ y] ψ , it follows that
M ,s,σ∗  xψ .
Suppose xψ 6∈ s, by KtoMS, ψ[y/x] 6∈ s for each y such that ψ[y/x] is admissible. By IH,
M c,s,σ∗  ¬ψ[y/x] for each y such that ψ[y/x] is admissible. Due to the special assignment
σ∗ such that σ∗(y) = y, it is clear that M c,s,σ∗[x 7→ y]  ¬ψ for each y such that ψ[y/x] is
admissible.
Now consider any y′ such that ψ[y′/x] is not admissible, then by RMS, we can reletter the modalities
of y′ inψ with some fresh variable to obtainψ ′ such that `ψ↔ψ ′ andψ ′[y′/x] is admissible. Now
by RE, xψ ′ 6∈ s. We can then repeat the reasoning above to obtainM c,s,σ∗[x 7→ y′]  ¬ψ ′ for
this y′. Since ` ψ ↔ ψ ′, by soundness,M c,s,σ∗[x 7→ y′]  ¬ψ . Therefore for each y, no matter
whether ψ[y/x] is admissible, we haveM c,s,σ∗[x 7→ y]  ¬ψ . ThereforeM c,s,σ∗  ¬xψ .
Note that not every SMLMSK+-consistent set of formulas can be extended into a world inM c, e.g.,
{xϕ(x)} ∪ {¬ϕ(x) | x ∈ X+} cannot be extended consistently to obtain the ∃-property. However,
every SMLMSK-consistent set can be extended into a world in W c by adding the witness one by one
using the new variables (cf. [24]).
Lemma 6.3 Every SMLMSK-consistent set of MLMSK-formulas can be extended into an SMLMSK+-
maximal consistent set of MLMSK+-formulas with ∃-property.
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Now based on Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.2, every SMLMSK-consistent set is satisfiable by some pointed
model and an assignment. The completeness follows:
Theorem 6.1 SMLMSK is strongly complete w.r.t. MLMSK over S5 models.
The completeness of SMLMSK≈ is quite routine based on the completeness proof of SMLMSK. We
only sketch the idea here following [24].
Theorem 6.2 SMLMSK≈ is strongly complete w.r.t. MLMSK≈ over S5 models.
Unfortunately, MLMSK over (constant-domain) S5 models is indeed too powerful, we can code
first-order formulas by replacing each quantifier in a first-order formula in the prenex form byx or ♦x
respectively. We can show that this translation preserves the satisfiability. For example, we can translate
∃x∀yϕ (ϕ is quantifier-free) into an MLMSK formula x♦yϕ , which is equivalent to the first-order
modal formula ∃x∀yϕ over S5 models, and it implies ∃x∀yϕ by reflexivity. If a first-order formula is
satisfiable then we can build a single-world S5 model such that the translated MLMSK-formula is also
satisfiable. On the other hand, if the translated MLMSK-formula is satisfiable in some pointed MLMSK
S5 model, then we can just pick the designated world in that model as a first-order structure to satisfy
the original first-order formula. This leads to the undecidability of MLMSK due to the undecidability of
first-order logic:
Theorem 6.3 MLMSK is undecidable over S5 models.
7 Future work
Due to limited space, we omit several proofs and some additional results, and leave them to the extended
version of this conference paper. We believe that this is only the beginning of an interesting story. On the
technical side, we may study potential properties of MLMS≈ such as interpolation, frame definability,
characterization over finite models, axiomatization and (un)decidability on various frame classes (with or
without extra constant symbols). Although the full MLMSK over S5 models is undecidable, the concrete
“propositional” know-wh logics mentioned in the introduction are usually decidable. One explanation
is that the existing know-wh logics are often similar to one-variable fragments of the first-order modal
language, which may lead to decidability over S5 and other models [43], e.g., the conditional knowing
value formulas Kv(ϕ,c) discussed in [41, 42] are essentially ∃x(ϕ → c = x). A detailed comparison
with known guarded-like fragments with extra frame constraints will be very useful to understand the
new framework more deeply. Moreover, we believe our techniques and results can be generalized to
poly-modal (multi-agent) settings. It then makes sense to discuss the mention-some version of common
knowledge operator Cx := ∃xC where C is the propositional common knowledge operator.19 There is
also a clear similarity with modal logic over neighbourhood models, which is worth exploring.
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